

identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY

B6



FILE: [Redacted]
SRC 06 281 50610


Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

Date MAY 06 2009

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the preference visa petition. The petition is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a hospital. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a physical therapist. The petitioner asserts that the beneficiary qualifies for Schedule A, Group I labor certification pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.5(a). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had properly posted notice of filing the application for permanent employment certification at the place where it intends to employ the beneficiary. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed and timely. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into this decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the acting director's November 14, 2006 denial, the issue in this case is whether the petitioner established that it properly posted notice of filing the application for permanent employment certification at the beneficiary's place of employment.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), also provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions.

On September 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, for classification of the beneficiary under section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act as a physical therapist. Aliens who will be permanently employed as physical therapists are identified on Schedule A as set forth at 20 C.F.R. § 656.5 as being aliens who hold occupations for which it has been determined that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified and available, and that the employment of aliens in such occupations will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers who are similarly employed.

An employer shall apply for a labor certification for a Schedule A occupation by filing an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, in duplicate with the appropriate United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) office. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.15, a Schedule A application shall include:

- 1) An Application for Permanent Employment Certification form, which includes a prevailing wage determination in accordance with § 656.40 and § 656.41.

- 2) Evidence that notice of filing the Application for Permanent Employment Certification was provided to the bargaining representative or the employer's employees as prescribed in § 656.10(d).

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal. Relevant evidence submitted on appeal includes a statement from the petitioner. The record also contains a job posting notice dated September 5, 2006. The record does not contain any other documentation relevant to the issues of whether the petitioner posted notice of filing the application for permanent employment certification at its facility.

The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(1) provides in relevant part:

In applications filed under §§ 656.15 (Schedule A), 656.16 (Shepherders), . . . the employer must give notice of the filing of the Application for Permanent Employment Certification and be able to document that notice was provided, if requested by the Certifying Officer, as follows:

- (i) To the bargaining representative(s) (if any) of the employer's employees
- (ii) If there is no such bargaining representative, by posted notice to the employer's employees at the facility or location of the employment. The notice must be posted for at least 10 consecutive business days. The notice must be clearly visible and unobstructed while posted and must be posted in conspicuous places where the employer's U.S. workers can readily read the posted notice on their way to or from their place of employment. Appropriate locations for posting notices of the job opportunity include locations in the immediate vicinity of the wage and hour notices required by 29 CFR 516.4 or occupational safety and health notices required by 29 CFR 1903.2(a). In addition, the employer must publish the notice in any and all in-house media, whether electronic or printed, in accordance with the normal procedures used for the recruitment of similar positions in the employer's organization. The documentation requirement may be satisfied by providing a copy of the posted notice and stating where it was posted, and by providing copies of all the in-house media, whether electronic or print, that were used to distribute notice of the application in accordance with the procedures used for similar positions within the employer's organization.

According to the regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(3):

The notice of the filing of an Application for Permanent Employment Certification must:

- i. State the notice is being provided as a result of the filing of an application for permanent alien labor certification for the relevant job opportunity;
- ii. State any person may provide documentary evidence bearing on the application to the Certifying Officer of the Department of Labor;
- iii. Provide the address of the appropriate Certifying Officer; and
- iv. Be provided between 30 and 180 days before filing the application.

In this case, the record reflects that the petitioner posted a notice of the filing of the application for permanent employment certification. This notice was dated as being posted from August 15, 2006 and that it was not removed, as it was a permanent posting. The AAO notes that the notice was signed on September 5, 2006. The regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-102(e) defines a "business day" as "any day other than Saturday, Sunday or any other day designated as a holiday by the Federal Government." This office notes that August 19, 20, 26 and 27 were weekends. Therefore, the 10th business day after August 15, 2006 was August 29, 2006. The director states that the notice was not posted for the required ten business days ending at least 30 days prior to the filing of the petition on September 26, 2006, and thus determined that this posting does not meet the requirements for posted notices to the employer's employees as set forth at 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(1)(ii) and 656.10(d)(3)(iv).

Counsel asserts that the petitioner complied with 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d) as posting notices for physical therapists are posted continuously as different physical therapist positions are available on a continuous basis. The petitioner states that one master posting notice, posted for several months at a time, and replaced only when prevailing wages change or the notice becomes worn has been found to be the most expedient way to notify its current employees of these continual openings. However, counsel offered no evidence of posting these other notices. The record only contains the notice posted on August 15, 2006. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998)(citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

The AAO notes that the regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(1) mandates that the posting be posted "ten business days." The AAO finds that the petitioner posted the notice for the required ten business days from August 15, 2006 until the date the notice was signed on September 5, 2006. However, as the 10th day of posting fell only 28 days prior to filing the petition, the petitioner failed to meet the requirements in 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(3)(iv), and the petition must be denied.

Beyond the acting director's decision, the AAO notes that an additional issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. An application or petition that fails to

comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis).

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director may accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establishes the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 9089, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 9089, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 9089 is \$31.40 per hour (\$65,312.00 per year). The Form ETA 9089 states that the position requires a bachelor's degree.

The petitioner is a hospital. On the Form I-140 petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1911, to have a gross annual income of approximately \$64,201,000. and to currently employ 739 workers. However, the record does not contain a statement from a "financial officer" establishing an ability to pay. The human resources director does not appear to be a "financial officer." There are no tax records submitted into the record. On the Form ETA 9089, signed by the beneficiary on September 19, 2006, the beneficiary claims to have worked for the petitioner from May 1, 2006 to the present time.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period in the absence of a financial officer statement establishing an ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the beneficiary states on the ETA 9089 that she has worked for the petitioner from May 1, 2006 to the present time. The AAO notes that the record does not include any documentation, such as W-2 Forms, earnings statements or tax statements for the beneficiary showing that she worked for the petitioner. As such, the petitioner has not established by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figures reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax returns, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537.

The AAO notes that the record fails to include any tax returns for the petitioner. As such, the petitioner has not established that it has the sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's assets. We reject, however, the idea the petitioner's total assets should have been considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, USCIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.¹ As previously noted, the record fails to include any tax returns for the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner has not demonstrated that it has sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

Thus, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

Although USCIS will not consider gross income without also considering the expenses that were incurred to generate that income, the overall magnitude of the entity's business activities should be considered when the entity's ability to pay is marginal or borderline. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967). While the petitioner states on the Form I-140 that it was incorporated in 1911, employs approximately 739 employees, and its gross income is \$64,201,000.00, the AAO notes that the record does not include any documentary evidence, such as tax statements for the petitioner, to support such assertions. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence will not meet the burden of proof of this proceeding. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998)(citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Thus, assessing the totality of circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not proven its financial strength and viability and has the ability to pay the proffered wage.

¹According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

The denial of this petition is without prejudice to the filing of a new petition by the petitioner accompanied by the appropriate supporting evidence and fee.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.