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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Immigration and Citizenship Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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Washington, DC 20529-2090
U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



H2

Date: **FEB 28 2012** Office: HIALEH, FLORIDA FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Michael Shumway
for Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Hialeah, Florida, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Cuba. He was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The director indicated that the applicant sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant states that the waiver application was denied because he failed to submit a letter from his lawful permanent mother, which he is providing on appeal.

The applicant was found to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act, which states, in pertinent parts:

- (i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –
 - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

On January 7, 2009, the applicant pled guilty to, and was found guilty of, leaving the scene of a crash/injury in violation of section 316.027(1)(A) of the Florida Statutes. The judge stayed and withheld adjudication of guilty, and placed the applicant on probation and ordered that the applicant pay costs.

The director found the applicant was inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. As the applicant has not disputed inadmissibility on appeal, and the record does not show the finding of inadmissibility to be erroneous, we will not disturb the finding of the director.

The waiver for inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II) of the Act is found under section 212(h) of the Act. That section provides, in pertinent part:

- (h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I) . . . if –

...

- (B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme

hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . .

Extreme hardship is “not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning,” but “necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.” *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative’s family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative’s ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one’s present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm’r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-*

Buenfil v. INS, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

In rendering this decision, the AAO will consider all of the evidence in the record.

The applicant's mother stated in the undated letter that she has a close relationship with the applicant, who is now 24 years old, and was separated from him when she left Cuba and came to the United States on November 12, 2004. She conveyed that they reunited on May 5, 2008 and that her son takes care of her, particularly when she has asthma. The applicant's mother indicated that she has a stronger bond with her son than her daughter. She conveyed that she lacked freedom in Cuba and struggled to support her family, and has a home in the United States. She maintained that she cannot imagine living without her son, and that she and her son will not have a future in Cuba.

The asserted hardship factors in remaining in the United States without the applicant are emotional in nature. The applicant's mother described the emotional hardship she will experience consequent to separation from her son. There is insufficient evidence to demonstrate other support the applicant provides his mother. While we acknowledge the hardship of family separation, the record does not reveal hardship beyond that which is a common or typical result of removal and inadmissibility. The applicant's mother indicated that she has asthma, but she does not describe her condition as substantially limiting her ability to function and carry out major life activities. When the asserted hardship factors are considered collectively, they do not demonstrate that the applicant's mother will experience extreme hardship if she remains in the United States without him.

In regard to the applicant's mother joining her son to live in Cuba, the asserted hardship factors are emotional and financial in nature. The applicant's mother stated that she struggled to support her family in Cuba and had restricted freedom. But she has not fully described the hardships that she will experience if she joined her son to live in Cuba. Additionally, evidence in the record reflects that when the applicant first arrived in the United States in 2008, he expressed to immigration officers no fear of returning to Cuba, and stated that he was a good student there, and that his father lives in Cuba. Accordingly, when the hardship factors are considered collectively, we find that they do not demonstrate that the applicant's mother will experience extreme hardship if she joins her son to live in Cuba.

Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed and the waiver application will be denied.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.