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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date: MAY 04 2009

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant, a native and citizen of Mexico, initially entered the United States without inspection in September 1995. She did not depart the United States until September 2005. The applicant accrued unlawful presence from April 1, 1997, the date of the enactment of the unlawful presence provisions, until her departure in September 2005. She was thus found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year.¹ The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse and children, born in 1996 and 2003.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Form I-601, Application for Waiver of Ground of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated June 12, 2006.

In support of the appeal, counsel for the applicant submits a letter, dated June 19, 2006; a letter from the applicant's spouse, dated June 26, 2006; a letter from the applicant's U.S. citizen child; birth certificates of the applicant's two children; and photographs of the applicant and her family. In addition, the applicant's spouse sent four separate status inquiry requests in 2007. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an

¹ The applicant does not contest the district director's finding of inadmissibility. Rather, she is filing for a waiver of inadmissibility.

immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien...

To begin, the record contains references to the hardship that the applicant's U.S. citizen children would suffer if the applicant's waiver of inadmissibility is not granted. Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides that a waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act is applicable solely where the applicant establishes extreme hardship to his or her citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent. Unlike waivers under section 212(h) of the Act, section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) does not mention extreme hardship to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident child. Nor is extreme hardship to the applicant herself a permissible consideration under the statute. In the present case, the applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative, and hardship to the applicant and/or their children cannot be considered, except as it may affect the applicant's spouse.

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative "is not . . . fixed and inflexible," and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566. The BIA held in *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted) that:

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse further contends that he will suffer emotional and financial hardship if the applicant is unable to reside in the United States. In two separate declarations the applicant's spouse states that he is suffering extreme emotional hardship due to the long and close relationship he has with his spouse. The applicant's spouse further contends that he is suffering emotionally as he is separated from his two young children, who are currently residing in Mexico with the applicant; the applicant's spouse asserts that the children are very important to him and he misses him, and he is suffering due to the decreased standard of living his children are experiencing

while in Mexico. The applicant's spouse also contends that he is suffering extreme financial hardship, as his spouse is unable to find a job in Mexico and thus, he is forced to support two households. *Letters from* [REDACTED] dated September 18, 2005 and June 26, 2006.

To begin, it has not been established that the applicant's spouse's emotional hardship is extreme. Nor has it been established that the applicant's spouse is unable to travel to Mexico, his home country, to visit the applicant on a regular basis. In addition, it has not been established that the applicant's children will suffer extreme hardship were they to reside in the United States with their father or alternatively, were they to remain abroad with the applicant, thereby causing extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse, the qualifying relative in this case. Although references are made to the fact that the children are unable to reside with the applicant's spouse in the United States as he has no one to help care for the children while he is at work, it has not been established that he would be unable to make alternate work arrangements and/or obtain appropriate child care, thereby affording him the opportunity to reside with his children. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Although the depth of concern and anxiety over the applicant's inadmissibility is neither doubted or minimized, the fact remains that Congress provided for a waiver of inadmissibility only under limited circumstances. In nearly every qualifying relationship, whether between husband and wife or parent and child, there is a deep level of affection and a certain amount of emotional and social interdependence. While, in common parlance, the prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists. The current state of the law, viewed from a legislative, administrative, or judicial point of view, requires that the hardship be above and beyond the normal, expected hardship involved in such cases.

As for the financial hardship referenced by the applicant's spouse, the AAO notes that courts considering the impact of financial detriment on a finding of extreme hardship have repeatedly held that, while it must be considered in the overall determination, "[e]conomic disadvantage alone does not constitute "extreme hardship." *Ramirez-Durazo v. INS*, 794 F.2d 491, 497 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that "lower standard of living in Mexico and the difficulties of readjustment to that culture and environment . . . simply are not sufficient."); *Shooshtary v. INS*, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating, "the extreme hardship requirement . . . was not enacted to insure that the family members of excludable aliens fulfill their dreams or continue in the lives which they currently enjoy. The uprooting of family, the separation from friends, and other normal processes of readjustment to one's home country after having spent a number of years in the United States are not considered extreme, but represent the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens in the respondent's circumstances."); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship);

INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (upholding BIA finding that economic detriment alone is insufficient to establish extreme hardship).

No documentation has been provided that outlines the applicant's and his spouse's financial situation, including income, expenses, assets and liabilities, and their financial needs, to establish that due to the applicant's physical relocation abroad, the applicant's spouse is experiencing extreme financial hardship. Moreover, no documentation has been provided to establish that the applicant is unable to obtain gainful employment in Mexico, thereby decreasing the financial burden on the applicant's spouse. As referenced above, assertions without supporting documentation do not suffice to establish extreme hardship.

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse will endure hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. However, his situation, if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. The AAO concludes that based on the evidence provided, it has not been established that the applicant's spouse is suffering extreme emotional and/or financial hardship due to the applicant's absence.

The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must also be established in the event that he or she relocates abroad based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. This criteria has not been addressed. As such, it has not been established that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to relocate to Mexico, his birth country, to reside with the applicant.

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse will face extreme hardship if the applicant is unable to reside in the United States. Rather, the record demonstrates that he will face no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States and/or refused admission. There is no documentation establishing that his emotional and/or financial hardship is any different than other families separated as a result of immigration violations. Although the AAO is not insensitive to the applicant's spouse's situation, the record does not establish that the financial strain and emotional hardship he faces rises to the level of "extreme" as contemplated by statute and case law. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.