


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
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U.S. Citizenship  
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Services

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FILE:



Office: Vermont Service Center


Date:

**MAY 21 2007**

[EAC 04 039 50975]

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Temporary Protected Status under Section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

Self-represented

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center (VSC), and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant claims to be a native and citizen of El Salvador who is seeking Temporary Protected Status (TPS) under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1254.

The director denied the application because the applicant failed to establish she was eligible for late registration. The director also found that the applicant had failed to establish her qualifying continuous residence and continuous physical presence in the United States during the requisite periods.

On appeal, the applicant asserts her claim of eligibility for TPS.

As stated in 8 C.F.R. § 244.1, “register” means “to properly file, with the director, a completed application, with proper fee, for TPS during the initial registration period designated under section 244(b) of the Act.”

The record reveals that the applicant filed a first Form I-821, Application for Temporary Protected Status, on August 16, 2002, during the initial registration period (EAC 02 266 50460 relates). That application was denied due to abandonment on July 23, 2003, because the applicant failed to respond to a request for evidence to establish her qualifying continuous residence and continuous physical presence in the United States during the requisite time periods. Since the application was denied due to abandonment there was no appeal available; however, the applicant could have filed a motion to reopen within 30 days from the date of the denial. The applicant did not file a motion to reopen during the requisite timeframe.

The applicant filed the current Form I-821 on November 24, 2003. On March 24, 2004, the director requested the applicant to submit evidence to establish her eligibility for late registration as well as her qualifying continuous residence and continuous physical presence. The record reveals that the applicant failed to respond to the request; therefore, the director denied the application on July 13, 2004.

Any Form I-821 application subsequently submitted by the same applicant after an initial application is filed and a decision is rendered, must be considered as either a request for annual re-registration or as a new filing for TPS. If the applicant is filing an application as a re-registration, a previous grant of TPS must have been afforded the applicant, as only those individuals who are granted TPS must register annually. In addition, the applicant must continue to maintain the conditions of eligibility. 8 C.F.R. §244.17.

Section 244(c) of the Act, and the related regulations in 8 C.F.R. § 244.2, provide that an applicant is eligible for TPS only if such alien establishes that he or she:

- (a) Is a national, as defined in section 101(a)(21) of the Act, of a foreign state designated under section 244(b) of the Act;
- (b) Has been continuously physically present in the United States since the effective date of the most recent designation of that foreign state;

- (c) Has continuously resided in the United States since such date as the Attorney General may designate;
- (d) Is admissible as an immigrant except as provided under § 244.3;
- (e) Is not ineligible under § 244.4; and
- (f)
  - (1) Registers for Temporary Protected Status during the initial registration period announced by public notice in the FEDERAL REGISTER, or
  - (2) During any subsequent extension of such designation if at the time of the initial registration period:
    - (i) The applicant is a nonimmigrant or has been granted voluntary departure status or any relief from removal;
    - (ii) The applicant has an application for change of status, adjustment of status, asylum, voluntary departure, or any relief from removal which is pending or subject to further review or appeal;
    - (iii) The applicant is a parolee or has a pending request for reparole; or
    - (iv) The applicant is a spouse or child of an alien currently eligible to be a TPS registrant.
- (g) Has filed an application for late registration with the appropriate Service director, within a 60-day period immediately following the expiration or termination of conditions described in paragraph (f)(2) of this section.

Persons applying for TPS offered to El Salvadorans must demonstrate continuous residence in the United States since February 13, 2001, and continuous physical presence since March 9, 2001. The initial registration period for Salvadorans was from March 9, 2001, through September 9, 2002. The record reveals that the applicant filed the current application with Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) on November 24, 2003.

To qualify for late registration, the applicant must provide evidence that during the initial registration period she fell within at least one of the provisions described in 8 C.F.R. § 244.2(f)(2) above.

The burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that he or she meets the above requirements. Applicants shall submit all documentation as required in the instructions or requested by CIS. 8 C.F.R. § 244.9(a). The

sufficiency of all evidence will be judged according to its relevancy, consistency, credibility, and probative value. To meet his or her burden of proof the applicant must provide supporting documentary evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own statements. 8 C.F.R. § 244.9(b).

On March 24, 2004, the applicant was requested to submit evidence establishing her eligibility for late registration as set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 244.2(f)(2). The applicant was also requested to submit evidence establishing her continuous residence in the United States as of February 13, 2001, and continuous physical presence in the United States from March 9, 2001, to the date of filing her application.

The director determined that the record did not contain a response from the applicant, and therefore, the denied the application on July 13, 2004, on the basis that the applicant had failed to establish her eligibility for late registration and her qualifying continuous residence and continuous physical presence in the United States during the requisite time periods.

On appeal, the applicant states that she responded to the director's request for evidence and submits additional evidence in support of her claim to eligibility for TPS.

The first issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant is eligible for late registration. A review of the record of proceedings reflects that the applicant has not submitted any evidence to establish that she has met any of the criteria for late registration described in 8 C.F.R. § 244.2(f)(2). Consequently, the director's decision to deny the application on this ground will be affirmed.

The second issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has established her qualifying continuous residence and continuous physical presence in the United States.

A review of the evidence in the record of proceedings reflects that the applicant has submitted photocopies of billing statements from Washington Gas, Inc. dated November 27, 2000, and from Pepco dated December 20, 2000. In addition, the applicant has submitted photocopies of a letter dated January 15, 2001, from The JCPenny Card. These documents all appear to have been altered as the original name, addresses, and dates seem to have been covered-over and the applicant's name, address, and alternate dates have been inserted in their place. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1988). The applicant has failed to submit any objective evidence to explain or justify the apparent alterations of the evidence as above. Therefore, the reliability of the remaining evidence offered by the applicant is suspect and it must be concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that she satisfies the continuous residence and continuous physical presence requirements described in 8 C.F.R. §§ 244.2(b) and (c). Consequently, the director's decision to deny the application for temporary protected status on these grounds will also be affirmed.

Beyond the decision of the director, the record of proceedings reveals that the applicant stated to the United States Border Patrol that she is a citizen of Guatemala when she was apprehended on March 21, 1998, near Brownsville,

Texas attempting to enter the United States illegally using the alias of [REDACTED]

Section 244(c) of the Act, and the related regulations in 8 C.F.R. § 244.2(a), provide that an applicant is eligible for temporary protected status only if such alien establishes that he or she:

Is a national of a foreign state designated under section 244(b) of the Act;....

In *Chee Kin Jang v. Reno*, 113 F. 3d 1074 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997), the United States Court of Appeals found that the Service reasonably interpreted the term “PRC national” in CSPA (Chinese Student Protection Act) to Exclude Chinese dual nationals who did not declare citizenship of PRC (People’s Republic of China) when they entered the United States, and that the Service’s treatment of PRC dual nationals, depending on whether they entered under a PRC passport or a passport of a different country, was reasonable. The Court states that an alien is bound by the nationality claimed or established at the time of entry for the duration of his or her stay in the United States. Thus, a dual national CSPA principal applicant must have claimed PRC nationality at the time of his or her last entry into the United States.

In *Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel*, 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 & n.9 (1984), the district court held that the practice of binding an alien to his claimed nationality “promotes the congressional policy of insuring that an alien will be able to return, voluntarily or otherwise, to his or her country of origin if requested to do so and provides for consistency in the enforcement of law, especially given the large numbers of nonimmigrant foreign nationals who visit the United States each year.”

Additionally, the Board of Immigration Appeals, in *Matter of Ognibene*, 18 I&N Dec. 425 (BIA 1983), concluded that although an alien may hold the phenomenon of dual nationality, an alien may only claim one citizenship at a time for purposes of immigration matters within the United States. As explained in *Ognibene*, clearly, it is not the prerogative or position of the United States to require a dual national alien nonimmigrant to elect to retain one or another of his nationalities. Equally as clear, the national sovereignty of the United States is acceptably and reasonably exercised through section 214 of the Act in holding that a dual national alien nonimmigrant is, for the duration of his temporary stay in the United States, of the nationality which he claimed or established at the time that he entered the United States.

The Board, in *Ognibene*, further held that under appropriate circumstances in a given proceeding of law, the operative nationality of a dual national may be determined by his conduct without affording him the opportunity to elect which of his nationalities he will exercise. The General Counsel, in GENCO Op. 84-22 (July 13, 1984), reinforced this concept and states, “In interpreting a law which turns on nationality, the individual’s conduct with regard to a particular nation may be examined. An individual’s conduct determines his ‘operative nationality.’ The ‘operative nationality’ is determined by allowing the individual to elect which nationality to exercise. The nationality claimed or established by the nonimmigrant alien when he enters the United States must be regarded as his sole nationality for the duration of his stay in the United States.” (Emphasis in original).

Additionally, the General Counsel, in GENCO Op. 92-34 (August 7, 1992), concluded that the Service may, in the exercise of discretion, deny TPS in the case of an alien who, although a national of a foreign state designated for TPS, is also a national of another foreign state that has not been designated for TPS. The General Counsel explains that "TPS is not a provision designated to create a general right to remain in the United States. Rather, the statute provides a regularized means of granting haven to aliens who, because of extraordinary and temporary circumstances, cannot return to their home country in safety. See id. 244A(b)(1)(A), (B), and (C), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(1)(a), (b), and (c)."

The applicant asserted that she was a Guatemalan citizen when she first attempted entry to the United States, and therefore, the applicant is ineligible for the provisions of section 244 of the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 244.2(a). For this reason, the director's decision to deny the application will further be affirmed as a matter of discretion.

The application will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. An alien applying for temporary protected status has the burden of proving that he or she meets the requirements enumerated above and is otherwise eligible under the provisions of section 244 of the Act. The applicant has failed to meet this burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.